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 The lack of consideration given to spatiality in dealing with human 
reality is neither a contemporary failing nor the product of global-
ization or the spread of new forms of virtual reality. We often fail 
to acknowledge that human beings, and therefore their actions and 
thoughts, relate to each other and to their surrounding environ-
ments within the “medium” of space: this means that we are always 
 localized. 1 We shall use the terms space and place interchangeably in 
this article, although we do not regard them as synonyms. A place is 
a marked space, a space that is qualitatively defined, that possesses an 
imprint, a character, a limit, and a history. 
 Phone calls, instant messaging, and video-conferencing seem 
to make the “here” extremely fluid and more indefinable than the 
“when.” This is unsurprising, as nowadays when we make a phone 
call we are more likely to ask, “Where are you” rather than, “Who’s 
calling?” because the caller’s name usually appears on our contacts’ 
list, whereas their location is unspecified (in the absence of a tracking 
device). However, the “where” is clearly not a matter of indifference 
to us, given the ever-growing demand for such devices. 
 Yet, on closer inspection human beings seem to be more familiar 
with space than with time. We often see people wearing a watch but 
we rarely see people with a compass. We always need to know the 
time but we never ask ourselves where we are because we think we 
know. The question “Where am I?” denotes a situation of discomfort: 
either a recovery from a situation in which someone is not in full pos-
session of his/her faculties (due to physiological causes or external 
constraints) or an expression of disappointment at being somewhere 
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one does not want to be. We use devices such as GPS only to locate 
the places and routes that are unfamiliar to us, while we make regular 
use of tools that indicate time on a daily and continuous basis. 
 Moreover, in order to explain who we are, today we often say where 
we come from, we tell people that we are from Europe, or from Italy, 
or from a little town over there: it depends on how far we are from 
that place and how far the interlocutor is perceived to be from us. The 
expression “I’m from . . . ,” unlike saying “I come from,” suggests that 
one’s origin is experienced as belonging. Even if nowadays, in one 
lifetime, there are several places where we may live, there is always a 
particular place with which there is a stronger bond. Today one’s ori-
gin might not be revealed by religion or skin color, but rather in the 
accent characterized by a residual dialect inflection, by the imagination 
full of images of sea or land, of lions and giraffes or ibexes, or by the 
metaphors inhabited by different figures. 
 Even though individuals and entire peoples move from one place 
to another, so that our “roots” have been replaced by anchors, to 
use Bauman’s words, and even though the media offers us a shared 
world to inhabit, we were born and we live somewhere. Whether this 
“somewhere” can be defined as a cosmos, a world, an earth, a place 
or so on, existence always takes place in a “where.” For this reason it 
is important to take spatiality into consideration when it comes to the 
philosophy of experience, ethics, and politics. It is an essential issue for 
anthropology and, therefore, for any human discussion. 
 Spatiality’s importance is signaled by a dialogical interrelationship 
between its components: each responding to the other. The relation-
ship between ethics and the experience of spatiality initiates the dia-
logue, as one considers the importance of this dimension for human 
life, and one wonders how to treat space in an ethical way and to 
look for ethical implications in the field of architecture, urban design, 
and environmental management. But should we not also pose to 
ourselves the opposite question: If human life is always transcenden-
tally localized, how might it inform the creation of ethics for human 
beings? There also seems to be a direct connection with politics. In 
this instance too there is a dialogical movement of thought. Spatiality 
has to be considered both as the relevant dimension for living together 
and also as the horizon against which political thinking is shaped. 
 Space and Corporeality 
 If human existence happens in and through place, it is because it is 
essentially a life in and through the body. A human being is an embodied 
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consciousness. This means that corporeality and consciousness exist as 
distinct but inextricably interconnected realities. The objectification 
of physicality is, therefore, always crossed by the subjective intention-
ality, and this, in turn, can only exist when it is objectified. 2 
 Therefore, space is both the medium in which the perception of 
objects can take place and also the medium in which one can move 
and act. And since we are able to move and act, we have to assume a 
certain grasp on space, thanks to which we can orientate and localize 
ourselves. 
 Being able to orientate and localize ourselves requires a certain 
knowledge of the context and in particular a knowledge of ourselves 
within such a particular context. While we orientate ourselves, the cer-
tainty of our position creates the dizzying possibility of being some-
where else: this causes an awareness that this place is only “one” place 
among many others. This place, no matter how much we bond to 
it, does not coincide with ourselves. It is not only the uneasiness we 
sometimes experience in a place that constantly reminds us that there 
is something outside us. Even when we feel comfortable in a place, 
we are guests of this place, we perceive it as something different from 
us, something from which we are separated, while we still struggle to 
enjoy it, to find protection and concentration in it, to become familiar 
with it. 3 We are “here” but we do not coincide with our “here.” We 
can leave this place and move somewhere else, and our “here” can 
become the “here” of other people. 
 Talking about Space 
 Talking about space is a difficult task. First of all, it is something that 
we experience. We act within it in a pre-reflexive way, without asking 
ourselves what we think about it, without being aware of it, on the 
basis of a familiarity that is more ancient than thought. 4 
 The structure of space is complex, it resists easy categorizations 
or characterizations and it includes subjective and objective elements. 
Cassirer’s  An Essay on Man is often quoted with respect to his distinc-
tion of fundamentally different types of spatial and temporal experi-
ences that cannot be put at the same level. 5 The lower level is defined 
as organic space and time. If we think about ants or bees, or the ability 
of chicks to orientate themselves and peck grains on the ground, we 
realize that a representation and an idea of space are not necessary 
to act in a place, and as a matter of fact these animals do not have a 
sense of spatial relationships. Organic space is also defined as “action 
space,” where actions are usually determined by practical needs and 
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interests. On the contrary, “perceptive space” is not an immediate fact 
given by senses, but it includes several experiential aspects, such as 
optical, acoustic, tactile, and kinesthetic elements. Perceptive space is 
the field of investigation of those who are interested in understanding 
the origins of perceptions. However, as Cassirer points out, from the 
point of view of a general theory of knowledge and of philosophical 
anthropology, rather than investigating the origin and development 
of perceptive space, it is necessary to analyze “symbolic space,” which 
will lead us towards the boundary between the human and animal 
world. Cassirer points out that having a representation of something 
is completely different from just dealing with it. Knowing how to use 
something for practical purposes is not enough in order to achieve its 
representation. We also need to have a general idea of it and to con-
sider it from different points of view, in order to discover its relation-
ships with other objects. It is also necessary to localize it and define its 
place within a general system. You can be familiar with some aspects of 
experience without having a representation of them: you can know an 
area very well and be able to move around very easily, without being 
able to trace a map of it. In the history of culture, for instance, we had 
to acquire a high degree of generalization to achieve the conception 
of an ordered outer space. Therefore, space for Cassirer has an organic 
dimension, a perceptive dimension, and a symbolic dimension. In 
each case, space is the medium where we establish relationships with 
the world and with the plurality that inhabits the world. “Our space,” 
“our place” is always somewhere where we get in touch with what is 
other from ourselves. 
 We can also try to distinguish between subjective and objective 
space. Subjective space is the grasp on space that is inseparable from 
a creature’s sensory and cognitive capacities and motor skills, from 
its body and environmental awareness and from its ability to interact 
with the environment itself. In other words, it is the perspective of an 
active involvement. It is an experiential space that is also an activity 
space, structured and focused on the corporeality of the subject and 
varying according to the subject’s motor, sensory, and cognitive abili-
ties. Subjective space is the space of behavior and does not depend on 
a theory of space. 
 In contrast to commonly received opinion, Heidegger argues that 
we cannot derive the concept of objective space simply from the idea 
of subjective space, nor from mere connections between subjective 
spaces. The idea of such connections implies the idea of objective space 
as the space where we can have this localization regardless of the par-
ticularity of experience. We cannot even speak about objective space 
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by eliminating the perspective elements, since we can eliminate the 
perspective elements only if we already possess the idea of an objective 
space, independent of subjective experiences. 
 As a consequence, we cannot derive objective space from subjec-
tive space. In the same way, subjective space cannot be derived from 
objective space: the idea of an experiential point of view is what con-
stitutes the subjective space and is exactly what is missing in the idea 
of objective space. 
 The fact that we cannot derive one space from the other does not 
mean that they are not interconnected. Even though they are con-
ceptually different, we cannot understand one without having an idea 
of the other. They are correlative: thinking in a radical way about 
one type of space implies possessing the idea of the other. The idea 
of subjective space requires a perspective within which this space is 
apprehended. Similarly, the idea of being in a perspective implies a 
transcendence that is made possible by the awareness of a wider con-
text in which our point of view exists. And yet, such awareness always 
occurs within a subjective grasp. 
 We experience reality as localization in a subjective way. However, 
the place we occupy does not become private because it does not 
coincide with ourselves, but it remains persistently common and it can 
be experienced from other perspectives in different ways. 
 Dwelling and Subverting 
 It has been said that human existence is the existence of an embodied 
consciousness that lives in a place. We also say that things have their 
own place, that they are somewhere. However, human beings and 
things live in places in two different ways. As a matter of fact, human 
beings always live among the things that inhabit their lives, even when 
they withdraw into their inner world. 6 Indeed, we say that human 
beings dwell, they relate intrinsically to the place where they live, 
while things just stay in it. People dwell in places through a process 
of familiarization (by hanging pictures on the walls, putting photos 
on their desks, planting trees in their garden or a hedge to establish a 
boundary, etc.) and orientation: in this way existence always possesses 
some coordinates and its logic is always a topological one. 
 This “being in” a place is being in a “here,” within a structure that 
has its mode of being as a horizon. Every “here” is placed in a fun-
damental connection with every “there,” be they understood as earth 
or world (leaving aside the debate about Heidegger’s use of the two 
terms). We enter the world from “here” and the world defines “here” 
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in relation to “there,” preventing “here” from closing into its tamed 
finiteness, 7 into its fictive self-sufficiency. 
 The point of view of place that coincides with the practice of famil-
iarization equates to a point of view on the world that subverts every 
possible appropriation: because the world itself represents the inap-
propriable. As a consequence, we can define dwelling—which is the 
mode of existence of human beings—as a practice of familiarization 
with what, from time to time, is our place, within a world in which 
we remain strangers, since, as we said, no “where” coincides with the 
self. 
 If we think about our home, we realize that it is characterized by 
a complex dynamic. Even if it represents the most intimate and cozy 
place for a human being, we cannot simply remove what cannot be 
assimilated. Or better, succeeding in such an aim would result in the 
transformation of the house into a prison. 8 On closer inspection, the 
dynamics of familiar and foreign, private and common seem to consti-
tute the logic of the space itself. 
 It is the dynamic itself that enables the existence of a sacred space 
(the use of the term “sacred” is not intended to sacralize the space as 
if it were the bearer of a divine quality, but it is used to indicate what 
pertains to the religious experience), where the restless tension can 
open up another level of experience, inverting the spatial dynamic of 
a house. 
 In this context the tension turns out to be on another level: it is not 
the world of the inappropriable and the inextricable that can in some 
way become more and more familiar and knowable. Instead, it can be 
defined as “outside the world.” Sacred space is something that we or 
our ancestors have built, but that we inhabit only occasionally: that is 
when we let our time be the  kairos in which we face God rather than 
the  chronos that measures our existence in the world. 9 A sacred space 
is true when it causes a thrill of anticipation to arise in the visitor, and 
she or he perceives an indefinite and powerful force that orders: “Be 
silent, because this place is full of overflowing presence.” Even though 
at first sight it can be compared to any other place, it possesses many 
peculiarities. A sacred space shows its power by overlapping the con-
nection between the world and the borderland. It is a peculiar experi-
ence: only the relationship with the Absolute enables the possibility of 
being “on the border.” 
 A sacred space can be so named only when it is not experienced as 
a shelter to protect yourself, with the guarantee of the Absolute, from 
the concerns of a world that fails to become your homeland. A sacred 
space is not meant to offer a permanent residence and its threshold 
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does not divide the troubles of history from the happiness of the 
 eschaton . On the contrary, it is the place of a fragile anticipation. 10 
 In this experience, the fact of being in that specific place becomes 
secondary. Some places, such as secluded and pilgrimage places, have 
always been an example of such experience, with different nuances. 
This does not mean that the location loses its meaning. The possi-
bility of subverting the topological feature suggests a redefinition of 
place: it is not only considered as a place where you are “in” but also 
“through-towards,” in a tension towards a fulfillment. The inherency 
within the place shows the traits of the dynamic relationship. 
 From this comes an interesting consideration: the subversion of 
place discloses the truth of the place. The subversive loyalty to our 
“here” tells us the right way of dwelling: first of all as a contrast with 
all the possible “theres,” and secondly as the relationship with what 
the “here” cannot encompass. 
 The Symbolic Dimension 
 Sacred space seems to guard and reveal, suggesting the mystery of 
topology. As a limit-situation, it is a hermeneutical place that shows the 
symbolic nature of all places. Such a symbolic nature is the necessary 
condition for the “fidelity of subversion.” Places are physical elements 
that have a metaphysical reference, the world’s sense of being. They 
carry out the re-cognition of the cross-reference in terms of allusion 
and memory. The symbol creates an increase of reality through a dis-
placement of meaning that can be defined as semantic impertinence. 11 
In other words, the meaning of a sentence arises from the failure of 
the literal interpretation of the statement. The symbol is the constant 
interference, the bewilderment, the calculated error, the disorder of 
the ordinary world that produces a thrill towards new possibilities. It 
addresses the whole human being, not only his or her intelligence. 12 
The symbols communicate their messages even if our rationality is not 
aware of them. The word symbol comes from the Greek  sym-b á llein , 
which means to put or throw together. The symbol is not a sign whose 
referent is fully knowable by the senses or conceivable by the mind, 
because for the mind the signifier and the signified are in the same 
level of reality, in the field of experience of phenomenal reality. The 
symbol has a multipurpose semantic ability; it has different levels of 
reference, that is, an essential meaning and some reflected meanings, 
which are in some way grasped through the senses. The crucial rule 
is the heterotopic break. 13 Take for example the advertisement of a 
famous Italian company: everything focuses around a piece of pasta, a 
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fusillo, that does not only represent the pasta (first meaning), but also 
recalls the symbolic universe of family relationships (second mean-
ing), when the piece of pasta is subjected to the heterotopic semantic 
impertinence and it is found not in a pot, but in the father’s jacket 
who is abroad and far from home. Obviously, the transition from the 
first to the second meaning does not imply the destruction of the level 
of signs. It should be noted, in fact, that the transition is possible only 
if the sign, the piece of pasta in this case, remains the same. In the case 
of sacred space or symbolic religious space, its sacrality (second mean-
ing) does not exist unless there is a secular, ordinary space (first mean-
ing), typical of every culture and age. In turn, in the ordinary place, 
which is the objectification of a need, we may also find an orientation 
in the overall horizon of reflected meanings. 
 The sacred place clearly expresses and, at the same time, opens up an 
understanding of what is missing, as the condition of what is possible, 
and this is precisely the path of symbolic consciousness. Symbolic con-
sciousness lies in the particular, but it also reads the universal aspect, 
holding together difference and identity. Steps, for example, act as 
the access point to a sacred place and, at the same time, effect a defa-
miliarization with the surrounding space. They seem to tell us “Take 
off your shoes, this is sacred ground.” 14 The sacred place has a clear 
performative function: to free what has been forgotten, to awaken the 
concern that our homeland is elsewhere. The traditional architectural 
elements that inscribe this symbolic directrix are, among others, ori-
entation, size, and the inscription of the square (world) in the circle of 
the whole structure or dome (God). Therefore, while establishing a 
relationship, it underlines the difference and the disproportion. From 
this perspective, the logic of waste, of monumentality, of the unnec-
essarily audacious structure of worship buildings acquire a meaning: 
they must express the impossible on the basis of functionality; they 
bring with them the mad task of seeing the invisible. 
 If sacred space is an explicit declaration of semantic impertinence, 
every place implies in some way a symbolic dimension, that is, it con-
sists first of all in what it is and, secondly, in both the act of referring 
and in the set of references to which it refers. In this the utopian ele-
ment is inscribed: a totalizing intention (not totalitarian), which lies 
in the ability to highlight what is missing, in an open tension never 
closed-in on itself. In this respect we can quote two interpretations that 
must be read with concern as the risks of what utopia might become. 
The first one is Carl Schmitt’s reading, who claimed the nihilistic and 
deterritorialized character of utopia, 15 and interpreted Thomas More’s 
essay as the manifestation of the possibility of a massive denial of all 
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the locations on which the old  nomos of the earth was based. He also 
interpreted the meaning of the word Utopia not simply as the non-
place,  nowhere , but also as the  u-topos par excellence, a denial com-
pared to which even the  a-topos has a bond, albeit negative, with the 
 topos. The second one is Fran ç oise Choay, who recognized in Utopia 
the same root of abstract and calculating representation that character-
izes modernity. 16 Utopia is neither the neutralization of the individual 
concreteness of places and landscapes, stories and time, nor the trans-
formation of the land in an undifferentiated space. Instead, it emerges 
both from the limit and from the openness of such individuality, pre-
cisely from the symbolic imprint that every place contains within its 
borders. Utopia tells us about the possible fulfillment toward which a 
place tends, that is the possibility of a place to transgress itself, to leave 
its own stasis in order to aim toward a good condition that still is not, 
an adaptation to a greater accomplishment. The Utopian conscious-
ness lives on a truly symbolic imagination and does not claim to fill up 
the gap between determinacy and the whole horizon of meaning in 
which it stands. 17 For this reason it is authentic and it is different from 
the anti-utopias and the dystopias, as well as from ideology. 
 Therefore, if the symbolic dimension characterizes the meaning of 
places, the art of shaping the built environment, what we call architec-
ture, does not only express solidity, usefulness, and beauty, but also the 
overall meanings of the sense of being in the world. These meanings 
even determine the composition, orientation, geometry, proportion, 
and decoration. They express themselves, for example, in the expan-
sion of space starting from a center, in the organization according to a 
vertical axis that is combined with the two axes of the horizontal plane 
forming the cross of the six directions (the four cardinal points, zenith 
and nadir), and in the relationship between the circle (and sphere), 
the most dynamic and least differentiated geometric shape, and the 
square (and cube), the most static shape. 18 We build because we dwell, 
as Heidegger states, subverting the platitude according to which we 
usually think about the art of building and cultivating. 19 
 The Question of Identity 
 Places are historical-geographical configurations. They express history, 
character, and long-standing structures. They also give life to physiog-
nomic identities (types) and to territorial individualities, which convey 
what we defined as the second meaning, the symbolic dimension. For 
this reason, if we interpret spaces only from a purely functional point 
of view, we will not be able to understand them fully. What is also 
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necessary, therefore, is a description of the identity that considers the 
natural and sociohistorical elements, the aesthetic-perceptual dimen-
sion, the archives of knowledge, traditions, memory, and potential 
projects that are their heritage. The question is to grasp the texture 
between persistence and referrals, which hint, at first, at other times 
and other places, and ultimately point to a whole world of sense and 
fullness of being. 
 Dwelling in places is the way in which we stay in this constel-
lation and we look after it. It is a practical relationship that also 
involves knowledge and affection, because places are texts that are 
constantly read, written, rewritten, and interpreted. The “conscious-
ness of place” is the dizziness deriving from that concrete objectivity 
that cannot be reduced to objectification. It has been defined as the 
awareness—acquired through a process of cultural transformation of 
the inhabitants—of the territorial heritage, that is to say, the value 
of common goods (material and relational) as essential elements for 
the reproduction of individual and collective, biological and cultural 
life. In this awareness, the path from individual to collective connotes 
the elements that characterize the reconstruction of communitarian 
elements as open, relational, and supportive forms. 20 The reappro-
priation of the consciousness of place is therefore understood as the 
necessary condition for individual and collective construction in the 
forms of territoriality and self-sustainability. 
 The question of identity arises when we imagine an established 
community and a place with a specific, physical, economic, and cultural 
connotation. Even though we are considering it here in a nonclosed 
and nontribal way, there are also very different conceptualizations of 
the relationship between a place and its inhabitants. In fact, a place 
is often read—as though it were self-evident—as a safe haven, as a 
partly consistent space from the cultural point of view, as a detached 
area. This reading has the downside of interpreting the contemporary 
processes of transformation as disarticulations, as the rise of a “space 
of flux” that replaces the meaning of “space of places.” 21 
 However, places cannot be interpreted as coherent, stable, and 
detached realities. And this was true in the past as much as today. 
When it comes to the identity of places, they can only be inter-
preted as the result of a long history of relationships with other 
places. Therefore, they must be read as particular interrelationships 
in a broader field, and thus may leave open the possibility both to 
appreciate their local originality and to recognize wider ties. 22 They 
must be interpreted as essentially open and permeable, as the product 
of ties and connections, rather than closed, separate, and exclusive 
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elements. In these intersections place acquires both its uniqueness and 
its interdependence on other places. The same can be said for human 
beings. Personal and group identities cannot be understood accord-
ing to an essentialist-naturalistic paradigm, because they are neither 
an immutable heritage, nor a simple and accomplished reality, with 
no deficiencies. 
 If the search for purified identities produces a geography of rejec-
tion, the idea of an open and interactive identity means the possibility 
of creating a geography of reception, 23 which corresponds more truly 
to the reality and to the life of places and human beings. 
 On Ethics and Politics 
 Understanding the human condition as transcendentally allocated and 
interpreting place as a symbolic reality and a nexus of intersections in a 
functional, aesthetic, affective, cognitive, and meaningful relationship 
with those who inhabit it brings about some significant implications 
for ethical and political reflection. 
 First of all, considering localization as the constitutive mode of 
human existence can offer an important perspective for ethical think-
ing in order to understand the connections between the dimensions 
that we call particular, relative, objective, and common. Moreover, in 
spatial experience we can interpret the essential relationships between 
self and other, familiar and alien, between what is private and what is 
inappropriable. This confirms what we can call “human amphiboly.” 
Being localized means being divided from others: every human being 
exists in a “here,” according to which others are “there.” Relationships 
with others are defined by such separation and the familiarity always 
takes place at a distance. Being localized implies an essential relation-
ship with our “here,” that is the place “outside us” that hosts us. 
 Being localized means that we orientate ourselves in the world 
starting from “our world,” according to a “subjective where” that 
is neither private nor one that we own together, something that is 
nonexcludable but rival, such as common goods. At first sight, the 
possibility of emancipating oneself from a “here” seems to be a posi-
tive feature. For example, it is believed that real knowledge can be 
achieved only if it is detached from a “here.” This claim is intriguing 
for thought and speculation. But if we really take into consideration 
human spatiality, we find out that real emancipation from our local-
ization cannot be attained by merely neglecting to acknowledge the 
fact that we are always located in a space. Moreover, it may be exactly 
the attention to locality that leads us towards a human correlation 
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between the relative and the universal. The relationship between the 
relative and the universal is revealed in the concrete experience of 
the “here” within a horizon with which it does not coincide, in its 
correlation with many other “theres” that represent the “here” of 
other people, and in the concrete experience of boundaries that are 
subverted in the effort to establish them. 
 However, the movement of thought has to be retraced in the 
opposite direction as well: ethical reflection can affect the practices 
that have to do with space. It is interesting to investigate what ethical 
theory concerned with human localization has to say about dwelling 
and about the building of places for human life. As a matter of fact 
inhabited places are often constructed places. However, there are also 
constructed places that are not meant for dwelling, as sacred places 
demonstrate, and we can live in places that are not built. We have to 
consider the ways of dealing with the places of human experience, that 
is to say, to investigate what distinguishes not only place, building, 
territory, house, city, and sacred space but also countryside, desert, 
and mountain. 
 This investigation deals with ethics but also has a considerable rel-
evance for collective life, be it intended as politics, which is related to 
the dynamics of acquisition of power, or as policy, related to laws that 
manage public affairs, or as polity, which is related to the dynamics of 
social cohesion. The transcendental allocation of human life brings 
about issues related to place not only in relation to a communitarian 
approach, but also if we consider the practice of public life as the art 
of  being together among strangers . 
 Here it becomes relevant that places are always interpreted by par-
ticular positions and reasons, and that the sense of place is conveyed 
not only by different media, such as novels, films, advertisements, 
paintings, but also by landscapes and by the decisions of domestic and 
foreign policy. A place can also refer to multiple geographic scales and 
involve different groups of people in different ways, that is to say, the 
same place can acquire different meanings for different people. These 
different meanings of place involve not only a consideration of past 
history, but also a vision of the future, and they may contradict each 
other and become sources of conflict. 
 We must not ignore the fact that interpretations are also carriers 
of social relationships, in a way that cannot be predetermined and 
that not only reflect but also affect relationships of power, which are 
sometimes latent. We can neither refer to the identity of place as a 
support for any form of conservatism (in the style of  Blut-und-Boden ), 
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nor interpret it as an a priori factor to recognize the positive value of 
difference. It is very difficult to claim that the local inhabitants have 
some sort of exclusive right to control or even interpret certain parts 
of the earth, simply because it is not so easy to define who the local 
inhabitants are. And this is precisely one of the issues at stake. It may 
occur that those who “came before” are most ready to understand 
local value as mere resources, tools of wealth, without taking into 
consideration the risks to human health, landscape, soil fertility, and 
social cohesion. 
 Today the question of the meaning of places is no less important 
than in previous eras, due to the greater and faster displacements of 
individuals and populations. In fact, the common belief that states 
that at the time of globalization places are no longer important in 
their peculiarities does not seem true. Rather, these places are “put to 
work” on the basis of what constitutes their specific heritage or weak-
ness in the present structure of unequal development. The uniqueness 
of places may also mean interconnected inequalities. 
 The question is to highlight, from time to time, the geography of 
power and the specific connection between social and spatial space 
as inescapable factors of the strategic scenario according to which we 
want to build our future. 
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